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We use a game theoretic model of contests to assess diﬀerent explanations for the
male performance advantage in competition. Comparing the testable predictions of
the model with the empirical evidence, we reject explanations involving male overcon-
ﬁdence, misperceptions about relative ability, and some preference diﬀerences. Ex-
planations involving female underconﬁdence, stereotype threat, and adverse female
reaction to competition are consistent with only some of the evidence, and an expla-
nation involving lower male risk aversion is consistent with most of the evidence. Two
explanations are consistent with all of the evidence: (i) male ability to perform may in-
crease in the face of competition, possibly due to changes in testosterone or adrenaline;
or (ii) males may care more about winning or get greater enjoyment from competition
than females.
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11 Introduction
A number of recent articles present evidence that males tend to respond more favorably than
females when faced with competition. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) conduct ex-
periments in which college students solve mazes, either on their own or in competition with
other students. They show that competition causes males to increase their performance
by more than females. Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) ﬁnd similar results when they study
footraces between young children: males increase their performance in the face of competi-
tion, while females do not. Cotton, McIntyre and Price (2010) conduct multiple-round math
competitions and ﬁnd evidence that males outperform females of the same ability during
the initial round of competition.1 This male advantage may help explain achievement diﬀer-
ences between males and females that have been documented in competitive academic and
workplace settings (Blau and Kahn (2000)).
In their inﬂuential article, Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) discuss various expla-
nations for the observed male advantage. Some explanations involve real diﬀerences between
males and females. For example, males may be inherently better competitors, or males may
enjoy competing or care about winning more than females. Some explanations are behavioral
in nature. For example, females may be under-conﬁdent about their chances of winning, or
males may be over-conﬁdent. Similarly, people may have inaccurate beliefs about the rela-
tive abilities of males and females, which could aﬀect their eﬀort during competition. Such
explanations, as well as the possibility that the performance gap is due to diﬀerences in
risk aversion, have been discussed in other papers as well, including Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), Croson and Gneezy (2009), and G¨ unther et al. (in
press, 2010). None of these articles provide a theoretical framework to assess the merits
of these explanations. However, there exists an extensive theoretical literature modeling
contests and tournaments that can be applied to provide insight into the causes of gender
diﬀerences in response to competition.
The current article provides a theoretical assessment of the possible explanations for
the male advantage during competition. We present a simple game theoretic model of a
two-person contest in which both players simultaneously choose eﬀort. Performance in the
contest is a function of both eﬀort and ability, with the probability of winning the contest
1Various recent articles work to determine in which settings the male advantage exists. Cotton, McIntyre
and Price (2010) show that the male advantage only lasts for one round in such a setting, and depends
crucially on the framing of the competition as a race. G¨ unther et al. (in press, 2010) ﬁnd that the male
advantage is task dependent, as they show that it exists during maze competitions, but not during competi-
tions involving word games, pattern matching, or memory tasks. Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) present
evidence that gender diﬀerences in the face of competition depend on participant background and social
norms. Our analysis is only applicable to settings in which the male advantage exists.
2increasing in one’s own performance and decreasing in opponent performance. Players may
diﬀer in their ability or preference parameters, as well as in their (potentially inaccurate)
beliefs about ability. The model, based on Tullock (1980) and Baik (1994), is the standard
framework in the theoretical literature for modeling contests with asymmetric players.2 Next,
we adapt the model to account for various explanations of the male advantage, then compare
the equilibrium predictions with the empirical evidence. Both the empirical and theoretical
analyses deﬁne the competitors’ type by their own gender and the gender of their opponent.
Therefore, instead of just comparing the performance of males and females, the analysis is
concerned about the relative performance of four player types: males when competing against
males (MvM), males when against females (MvF), females when against males (FvM), and
females when against females (FvF).
The empirical analysis considers datasets from both Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini
(2003) and Cotton, McIntyre and Price (2010). Together, the data allow us to draw conclu-
sions about relative performance. We show that males tend to outperform females, regardless
of opponent gender. The condition is statistically signiﬁcant, and we use the relationship to
reject any model that does not predict that the performance of each of the male types (MvM
and MvF) is greater than the performance of each of the female types (FvM and FvF).
The theoretical model predicts behavior that is not always in line with initial intuition.
For example, the model shows that competitors put in the most eﬀort in contests in which
they are evenly matched against an opponent. Starting from an evenly-matched contest,
increasing one player’s ability results in a less competitive contest, and in equilibrium both
players respond by putting forth less eﬀort. The high-ability player puts forth less eﬀort
because he can expend less eﬀort and still perform better than before. The low-ability
player puts forth less eﬀort because her marginal expected return from eﬀort is decreasing
in opponent ability. This means that in a lopsided contest, both players put forth less eﬀort
than in a contest between two same-ability players.
A high-ability competitor is more likely to win a contest against a low-ability competitor,
not because he puts in more eﬀort, but rather because he achieves higher performance
with the same eﬀort. This is an important distinction when considering explanations in
which players have misperceptions about their own ability or the ability of their opponent.
If a player is overconﬁdent in his own ability, for example, then he underestimates the
competitiveness of the contest, and puts in less eﬀort than if he had accurate beliefs about his
ability. If his ability advantage was real, his lower eﬀort would not fully oﬀset the advantage
2See also Dixit (1987), Nitzan (1994), Stein (2002), and Brown (2010). Skaperdas and Gan (1995)
incorporates diﬀerences in risk aversion into such contests. Application of contest theory to workplace
achievement include O’Keefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984), Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993), Chan (1996),
Tsoulouhas, Knoeber and Agrawal (2007) and Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm (2010).
3of higher ability, and he would still experience an increase in performance. However, because
he overestimates his ability, his lower eﬀort results in lower equilibrium performance.
The case of overconﬁdence illustrates the importance of formally considering the theo-
retical model. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) hypothesize that “It might be that
men are solving ‘too many’ mazes, because they ... are overconﬁdent about their abilities
and hence their chances of actually winning the tournament” (p 1060). This statement, and
others found in the literature, is inconsistent with a game theoretic model of contests. If a
male overestimates his ability, he underestimates the competitiveness of the contest which
causes him to put in less eﬀort and perform worse than opponents who have correct beliefs
about ability. The theoretical analysis shows that overconﬁdence has the opposite eﬀect on
performance than what has been assumed in the literature, and by comparing the model
to the empirical requirement, we are able to reject the male-overconﬁdence explanation of
gender diﬀerences. For similar reasons we can also reject a model in which players have in-
correct beliefs about male or female ability. Additionally, we rule out other explanations for
the male advantage including explanations in which players dislike losing to females, or have
preferences for competing against an opponent of the same gender. This leads us to reject
explanations for the male advantage involving male-overconﬁdence or general misperceptions
about ability, as well as a number of explanations involving preference diﬀerences.
A closer look at the empirical evidence allows us to rule out a model of female under-
conﬁdence. First, such a model predicts that male performance is independent of opponent
gender, which is inconsistent with the observations in the data. Second, it assumes that the
performance diﬀerences are the result of females underperforming in competition. This is in
contrast to evidence in the literature that the gender diﬀerences are due to males increasing
their performance when faced with competition rather than from females decreasing their
performance (e.g., Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini 2003, Cotton, McIntyre and Price 2010).
These same data also allow us to rule out some explanations involving females having a
lower ability to deal with the pressures of competition, including those involving stereotype
threat.3
Two explanations are consistent with all of the empirical evidence we consider. First,
males may increase their ability when faced with competition. This explanation does not
imply that males are better at solving math questions, competing mazes, or running races.4
3Stereotype threat refers to the idea that people suﬀer from additional anxiety when completing a task
that their “type” (e.g., gender, race) is stereotypically not good at performing. This increases the likelihood
they choke under the pressure of competition. See Gneezy et al. (2003, p 1059) and G¨ unther et al. (in press,
2010).
4Cotton, McIntyre and Price (2010) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) ﬁnd gender diﬀerences even when
controlling for a student’s performance in a non-competitive setting.
4Rather, it means that competition improves male ability to convert eﬀort into perfor-
mance. This could be the result of males beneﬁting more from increases in testosterone
or adrenaline.5 Second, males may care more about winning or enjoy competition more than
females. This explanation is also consistent with evidence that males choose to compete
more often than females (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). A third explanation–that
performance diﬀerences are driven by lower male risk aversion–is consistent with most of the
empirical evidence.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we provide a theoretical framework in
which to assess gender diﬀerences in reaction to competition. In addition to the explanations
considered here, the model may be adapted to consider alternative explanations, or to assess
the causes of performance diﬀerences in settings where player type is deﬁned by some other
characteristic rather than gender (e.g., race, age, income). Second, the model provides
guidance for future researchers in designing new experiments that will diﬀerentiate among
the alternative explanations that are consistent with the data. Third, we provide a formal
assessment of a number of popular explanations for the male advantage in competition.
Because of the strategic nature of competition, one’s choice of eﬀort and performance during
competition is not always as intuitive as people may assume. A careful consideration of the
competitive interaction allows us to rule out a number of explanations for the male advantage
in competition. At the same time, we provide evidence consistent with other explanations.
2 Evidence
This section presents experimental evidence which we then compare to the testable predic-
tions from the theoretical models in Section 3. The theoretical analysis develops predictions
involving the ordering of performance from the four gender combinations: males competing
against males (MvM), males against females (MvF), females against males (FvM), and fe-
males against females (FvF). This means that the empirical evidence should provide results
about the actual eﬀect of one’s own and opponent gender on performance.
Our data come from Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) (henceforth, GNR) and
Cotton, McIntyre and Price (2010) (henceforth, CMP).6 Both data sets present signiﬁcant
evidence that males on average tend to outperform females during competition. However, the
5Competition increases testosterone in males, but not for females, compared to the period leading up
to competition (Kivlighan, Granger and Booth 2005). Both testosterone and adrenaline improve physical
and mental performance (e.g., Clark et al. 1989, Chmura et al. 1998, Brisswalter et al. 2002, Salvador et al.
2003).
6The GNR data can be found in the May 30, 2001 working paper version of the published paper, and the
CMP data is available from the authors.
5predictions are weaker when we consider the eﬀects of both own gender and opponent gender.
Speciﬁcally, each data set is limited by the number of observations, and some predictions
regarding gender eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant. By combining the two sources into an
aggregate data set, we have enough observations to draw statistically signiﬁcant conclusions
about the eﬀect of gender on performance.
The CMP data involves 253 total participants (136 males and 117 females) competing
in contests to solve math problms as quickly and accurately as possible.7 Participants were
randomly matched with a single opponent, and competed in a one-on-one contest. The GNR
data involves 120 total participants (60 males and 60 females) competing in contests to solve
mazes as quickly as possible.8 Participants were randomly selected into groups of six people,
which were either mixed gender (three males and three females) or single gender. The person
to solve the most mazes in each group won a prize. To simplify the analysis and allow us to
combine the data sources, we categorize someone in a mixed-group as competing against an
opponent of the other gender.9
Analysis
For each data set, we form a standardized measure of performance by subtracting the mean
and dividing by the standard deviation. After this normalization a nonparametric Mann-
Whitney U (MWU) test cannot reject that the GNR and CMP data come from the same
distribution (p=0.957).10 The similar distributions in the two data sets make us more com-
fortable combining the data for an aggregate analysis. As we’ll see below, the point estimates
are also similar across the two.
Our model gives predictions about the rank ordering of performance for males and females
based on whether they are competing against their own or opposite gender. Thus in the ﬁrst
panel of Table 1 we list the average performance for MvM, MvF, FvF, and FvM. We do this
for the GNR and the CMP data separately and then for the aggregated data that combines
the two datasets. The second panel provides p-values for a set of exhaustive t-tests comparing
7Cotton, McIntyre and Price (2010) also presents data from multiple rounds of competition. They show
that after the ﬁrst round of competition, the gender diﬀerences disappear. Because of this, we only use data
from the ﬁrst round of competition. Because the data come from a ﬁeld experiment done in classrooms, the
number of participants was not predetermined by the researchers but by the class size. In classes with odd
numbers of students, one pair of competitors had three students instead of two.
8Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) also presents data from non-competitive treatments, which we
do not include in our data.
9Allowing for multiple opponents in the theoretical model greatly complicates the analysis without chang-
ing the results. See for example, Stein (2002).
10The distributions are both roughly symmetric with skewness close to zero (CMP = -0.13 and GNR =
0.17) and kurtosis slightly less than the normal (CMP = 2.86 and GNR = 2.62). Thus the two datasets have
similar higher moments.
6the means of each of the groups. Table 2 presents the same analysis using MWU tests rather
than t-tests.11 In GNR, the best performance comes from the MvF group, followed by MvM,
then FvF, and ﬁnally FvM. However, while FvM is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from both male
groups (p-values of 0.001 and 0.008 ), FvF is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from MvM (p-value =
0.185), though it is diﬀerent from MvF at the ten percent level (p-value = 0.063). In CMP,
the best performance comes from the MvM group, followed by MvF, then FvF, and ﬁnally
FvM. Once again, FvM is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from both male groups (p-values of 0.065
and 0.002). CMP can reject what GNR could not—FvF is diﬀerent from MvM (p-value =
0.032)—but the data are uninformative about FvF vs. MvF (p-value = 0.272).
The performance ordering of the four gender groups is almost identical in the two data
sets, with the exception being that in GNR males perform better when competing against
females, and in CMP males perform better when competing against males. In neither data
set is the interaction eﬀect of opponent gender signiﬁcant. As we wish to aggregate the data,
we test each of the coeﬃicents to see if it is statistically diﬀerent across the two datasets.
We run four individual t-tests and a joint test of all four restrictions and never reject the
hypothesis that both datasets are converging to the same estimate.12 Given these similarities,
we focus most of our attention below on the aggregated data, which, because of the larger
sample size, have more precise standard errors.
Neither of the individual data sources provides enough evidence on its own that, regardless
of opponent gender, males tend to outperform females. From GNR, we are not conﬁdent
that FvF is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than MvM (p-value = 0.185) and from CMP, we are
not conﬁdent that FvM performs worse than MvF (p-value = 0.272). Using both datasets
allows us reject equality across genders. Furthermore, when we aggregate the data, we see
that males signiﬁcantly outperform females, regardless of opponent gender. That is, we can
reject that either of the female groups (FvF or FvM) performs as well as either of the male
groups (MvM or MvF). This is true either as individual tests (the p-values on the relevant
comparisons range from 0.0001 for FvM vs. MvM, to 0.057 for FvF vs. MvF), or as a joint
test of all four restrictions at once (p=0.0002 in the aggregate data, in 0.007 GNR and 0.015
in CMP). This brings us to the ﬁrst condition, which we rely on in the theoretical analysis.
C 1 (required) Males outperform females, regardless of opponent gender.
11The Mann Whitney U test has the advantage of not relying on an explicit distributional assumption,
asymptotic or otherwise. Unfortunately it is not truly a test of means but rather of distributions, as it can
also reject because of diﬀerences in variance or higher order moments. Thus we base our discussion on the
t-tests in Table 1 but provide the additional MWU tests for reference. As one can see, the MWU tests
provide even stronger rejections than those in Table 1.
12p-values for CMP vs. GNR coeﬃcients are 0.869 (FvF), 0.355 (FvM), 0.163 (MvF), and 0.890 (MvM).
The joint test of all four restrictions cannot reject with a p-value of 0.583
7The theoretical analysis in Section 3 rejects any model that is inconsistent with C1. In
Section 4 we introduce a number of additional conditions from our analysis and the literature.
The additional conditions are not statistically signiﬁcant, and we therefore reject a model
outright only if it violates C1.
3 Theoretical Model
We apply theoretical models of contests to assess the various explanations for male-female
performance diﬀerences during competitions. The underlying model is based on Baik (1994)’s
adaption of Tullock (1980)’s rent seeking model to allow for player asymmetries. Later, we
incorporate risk aversion in a way similar to Skaperdas and Gan (1995).
3.1 A Simple Contest
Two players, i =1 ,2, engage in competition for a prize. The players independently choose
a level of costly eﬀort, ei ≥ 0, which aﬀects their probability of winning the contest. Let
Wi ∈{ 0,1} indicate whether player i wins the prize. Payoﬀs equal u∗
i = Wivi − ciei for
i =1 ,2, where vi > 0 is i’s beneﬁt from winning the contest, and ci > 0 is his cost of eﬀort.
Since behavior is unchanged by aﬃne transformations, we may rewrite the utility function
ui ≡ u∗
i/vi = Wi − τiei, where τi ≡ ci/vi. Thus, diﬀerences in τi account for diﬀerences in
both cost of eﬀort and value of winning.
Parameter ai > 0 denotes player i’s ability, and pi ≡ aiei denotes a player’s performance.
That is, ability represents how eﬀective one is at turning eﬀort into results. Player costs,
valuations, and ability parameters are common knowledge. The probability that player i
wins the contest depends on the performance of both players, and is equal to
pi
p1+p2 if pi > 0




− τiei.( 1 )
We solve for the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous move game. In equilibrium,
neither player can have an incentive to deviate from their eﬀort choice given the eﬀort choice
of the other player. Solving
∂Eu1
∂e1 = 0 and
∂Eu2
∂e2 =0f o re1 and e2 gives the equilibrium values





(aiτ−i + a−iτi)2,( 2 )
where subscript −i denotes the other player. A check of the second order conditions as-







(aiτ−i + a−iτi)2.( 3 )
Players may diﬀer in terms of their valuation and cost parameters, which enter our model
through τi, and in terms of their ability, ai. A player has a lower τi than his opponent, for
example, if he puts a higher value on winning the contest (a higher vi), or if he is more eager
to compete (a lower ci). A diﬀerence in a represents actual diﬀerences in players’ ability to
convert eﬀort into performance. This is the case, for example, if one of the players is better
at converting eﬀort into results under the pressures of competition, beneﬁts more from jumps
in adrenaline or testosterone that result from competition, or is less susceptible to stereotype
threat.
It is worth pointing out two results regarding the equilibrium solution that are helpful
in the later analysis. Both are formally derived in Baik (1994). First, starting out from an
even contest in which ai = a−i and τi = τ−i, suppose that we decrease one player’s preference
parameter τ (meaning we increase his enjoyment of competition or his value of winning).
Doing so causes the player with the higher τ to expend more eﬀort and achieve higher
performance, and for his competitor to expend less eﬀort and achieve lower performance.
Second, starting from an even contest, suppose that we increase one player’s ability a. The
player with the ability advantage can decrease his eﬀort and still perform better than he was
performing. In equilibrium, he chooses to decrease eﬀort but not by enough to fully oﬀset
the eﬀect of the ability increase on performance. The other player also cuts her eﬀort, but
for her the cut in eﬀort is not accompanied by an increase in ability and her performance
suﬀers. That is, increasing one player’s ability decreases both players’ eﬀort, decreases the
performance of the disadvantaged player, and increases the performance of the advantaged
player.
Incorporating Gender Diﬀerences
Our analysis uses this contest model to assess diﬀerent explanations for why males tend to
outperform females during competition. The remainder of the analysis assumes that players
are either “female” or “male,” although the categorization could just as easily be based on
race, age, or other observable characteristics. We formally deﬁne player type in terms of
both one’s own gender and opponent gender, as the analysis is concerned with the eﬀect
of both. Let t ∈{ FvF,FvM,MvF,MvM} denote a player’s type, where the ﬁrst letter
denotes one’s own gender, and the ﬁnal letter denotes opponent gender. When a variable is
9independent of opponent gender, we may simply use F and M to denote player type. To
keep the analysis as straightforward and intuitive as possible, we assume that all players of
the same type share the same values of τt and at.13
3.2 Ability Diﬀerences
The ﬁrst possibility we consider is that males are higher-ability competitors than females.
We incorporate this into the model by assuming that aM >a F. To focus the analysis on the
eﬀect of ability diﬀerences, here we assume τ = τM = τF.
Most empirical analyses identify a male advantage during competition, even when they
account for performance in non-competitive settings. The literature shows, for example, that
if you take males and females who are equally good at math and have them take a math
quiz in a competition, then the male students will typically outperform the female students
(Cotton, McIntyre and Price 2010). This means that the male advantage during competition
cannot be explained simply by males being better at the task at hand than females. Ability
diﬀerences, in our context, must refer to diﬀerences in the ability to compete. This may be
due to males receiving a greater beneﬁt from changes in testosterone or adrenaline, or males
otherwise having an advantage at converting eﬀort into performance during competition.14
In a male/female competition, the players diﬀer in terms of a but not τ. In this case, equi-
librium eﬀort simpliﬁes to e∗
i =
aia−i
(ai+a−i)2τ. This expression goes against standard intuition,
as e∗
i = e∗
−i, which means that both players put in the same amount of eﬀort independent
of which one has higher ability. This is because the marginal return on eﬀort depends on
how competitive the contest is. If one player is much more able than his competitor, this
decreases the return from eﬀort for both players. When competing against a low ability
opponent, a high ability player can put in less eﬀort and still win the competition most of
the time. Similarly, the low-ability player also puts in less eﬀort since the expected returns
from eﬀort are lower when competing against a high-ability player than when competing
against another low-ability player. This does not imply that the two players perform equally
well in equilibrium. When both players put in the same amount of eﬀort, the high-ability
player is better able to turn that eﬀort into performance with p∗
i ≡ aie∗
i.
13One could alternatively assume that same type players may diﬀer in terms of a and τ, but that the
distributions are such that one type tends to have an advantage over another type. For example, males may
tend to have higher ability or enjoy competition more than females. In such a setting, our results would
continue to hold for average performance, although they would not hold for every single competition.
14The testosterone and adrenaline stories are supported by evidence from the medical and psychological
literatures showing that male testosterone increases in the face of competition, and that testosterone and
adrenaline can improve psyical and mental performance. See for example Kivlighan, Granger and Booth
(2005), Chmura et al. (1998) and Salvador et al. (2003).
10In a male/male or female/female competition, the players share the same a and τ, in
which case equilibrium eﬀort simpliﬁes to e∗
i = 1




It is straightforward to calculate equilibrium performance for each competitor-opponent
combination.











For this result to be consistent with the empirical evidence as described in Section 2,
it must predict that each of the male performance variables exceed each of the female per-
formance variables (i.e., C1). The theoretical result satisﬁes this condition, and is thus
consistent with the signiﬁcant ﬁnding in the empirical data.
3.3 Under- or Overconﬁdence
Another explanation of the competitive performance gap involve female underconﬁdence
and male overconﬁdence. To assess these explanations, we consider a version of the model in
which players may have incorrect beliefs about their own ability. (The next section considers
misperceptions about an entire type’s ability.) Here, a player acts as if he has ability ˆ ai.I f
ˆ ai <a i, then i is said to be underconﬁdent.I f ˆ ai >a i, then i is said to be overconﬁdent.
To keep the analysis as straightforward as possible, players are naive in that they do not











(ˆ aiτ−i + a−iτi)2.( 5 )
Notice that performance still equals actual ability times eﬀort.
If a player’s misperceptions about his ability causes him to believe that the competition
is less-evenly matched, this causes him to decrease his eﬀort and performance. That is, if
ˆ aiτ−i <a −iτi, then e∗
i is strictly increasing in ˆ ai; and if ˆ aiτ−i >a −iτi, then e∗
i is strictly
decreasing in ˆ ai.
We consider the impact of diﬀerences in self conﬁdence in the absence of any actual gender
diﬀerences in a and τ. That is, a = aM = aF and τ = τM = τF. All players of the same type
15Future work may consider the impact of sophistication about the possibility of incorrect beliefs.
11have the same level of conﬁdence. If females are underconﬁdent in their ability, then ˆ aF <a ,
and the equilibrium expression for e∗
F and e∗
M simplify to e∗
F =
ˆ aFa
(ˆ aF+a)2τ and e∗
M = 1
4τ.I f
males are overconﬁdent in their ability, then ˆ aM >a , and simpliﬁed expressions for e∗
t may
be calculated in similar fashion. Deriving p∗
t for these cases is similarly straightforward.




















This result is consistent with the idea that players put in more eﬀort in competitions they
believe to be evenly matched. If a players thinks that a competition is lopsided, they put in
less eﬀort regardless of whether they are the player with an advantage. In equilibrium, over-
conﬁdent males decrease their performance just as underconﬁdent females decrease theirs.
Of the two conﬁdence stories, only female underconﬁdence is consistent with C1. Male over-
conﬁdence results in males performing worse than females in a male/female competition, in
contrast to the empirical evidence.
Although female underconﬁdence satisﬁes C1, we will show in Section 4 that it violates
a number of other conditions. A variation of the underconﬁdence story, in which females are
more underconﬁdent when competing against a male, continues to satisfy C1 and is slightly
consistent with more of the evidence presented in the later section.
Result 3 If females are under-conﬁdent and relatively more so when competing against










We could present a similar result for the case when male overconﬁdence depends on
opponent gender. It should be clear at this point, however, that male overconﬁdence results
in males underperforming females, which is inconsistent with the empirical evidence.
3.4 Perceived Diﬀerences in Ability
A related explanation for performance diﬀerences between males and females is that players
believe that males generally have higher ability than females. This is not the same as the real
12ability diﬀerences studied earlier, since we do not require actual diﬀerences in aF and aM.
Nor is this the same as diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence from the previous section, as players do
not believe they are more or less capable than others of the same type.
Again, assume a = aM = aF, and τ = τM = τF. We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst
case, players underestimate female ability. A player who does this acts as if all females have
lower ability than they actually do, acting as if female ability is ˆ aF <a . In the second case,
players overestimate male ability, in which case ˆ aM >a . As before, to keep the analysis


















We begin with the possibility that players underestimate female ability. As is the case
with actual ability diﬀerences, perceived diﬀerences cause both types of players to put in less
eﬀort when they compete against a member of the other group, compared with when they
compete against a member of their own group. When a male competes against a female and









Another possibility is that only males underestimate female ability. In this case, only the












When only females underestimate their ability, the results are symmetric to the case when
only males underestimate female ability. One can repeat this analysis assuming that players
overestimate male ability rather than underestimate female ability. In each of these cases,
a player who has misperceptions about ability will also have misperceptions about the com-
petitiveness of mixed-gender contests, and will put in less eﬀort compared to players with
correct beliefs. From this, we derive the following result.































All three predictions in Result 4 violate C1. This allows us to rule out explanations in
which performance diﬀerences are caused by perceived diﬀerences in ability.
3.5 Preference Diﬀerences
Here, we consider the possibility that performance diﬀerences are driven by diﬀerences in
preferences. For example, males may enjoy competition more than females, which is incor-
porated into the model by assuming that males have a lower cost of eﬀort (i.e., cM <c F).
Similarly, males may care more about winning the contest than females, which is incorpo-
rated into the model by assuming that males have a higher value of winning (i.e., vM >v F).
Both of these cases aﬀect the preference parameter τi ≡ ci/vi in the same way, implying
that τM <τ F. To focus the analysis on the eﬀect of preference diﬀerences, we assume
a = aM = aF.
In a male/female competition, the players diﬀer in terms of τ but not a. In this case,
equilibrium eﬀort simpliﬁes to e∗
i =
τ−i
(τi+τ−i)2. From this we can see that males will put in more
eﬀort than females, e∗
M >e ∗
F, when they care more about winning or get more enjoyment
from competing. In male/male and female/female competitions, equilibrium eﬀort simpliﬁes
as it did in the previous section with e∗
i = 1
4τi. It is straightforward to calculate performance
in each of these cases.
Result 5 If males care more about winning or if they get more enjoyment from competing










This result satisﬁes C1.
Other explanations involve preferences depending on opponent gender. For example,
players may receive greater beneﬁt from winning against a female opponent. Or, they may
enjoy competition against one gender more than against another. The model can allow














There are many cases that the model can consider in which gender diﬀerences and preferences
depend on own gender and opponent gender. Here, we present results for three situations
with intuitive appeal. The appendix considers other situations.
Result 6 If all players care more about winning or get more enjoyment from competing










If only males care more about winning or get more enjoyment from competing against females










If all players care more about winning or get more enjoyment from competing against an










Each of these situations, as well as the alternative situations presented in the appendix,
violate C1. This allows us to rule out explanations based on the idea that players want to
avoid “losing to a girl,” or in which players care more about winning against a same-gendered
opponent. However, it is impossible for the analysis to exhaust all possible preference cases,
and we recognize that other preferences may produce results that satisfy the required empiri-
cal conditions. These other preferences will likely have a similar ﬂavor as the male-enjoyment
story in Result 5. For example, the performance ordering in Result 5 continues to hold if
males enjoy competition more than females, and experience extra enjoyment when competing
against other males.16
16This variation of the male-enjoyment story is consistent with the behavioral science literature showing
that males have a preference for interacting with other males in competitive settings (e.g., Boyatzis, Mallis
and Leon 1999).
153.6 Diﬀerences in Risk Aversion
A ﬁnal explanation we consider involves diﬀerences in risk aversion between males and fe-
males. Here, we show that when females are more risk averse in the face of competition,
they may put in less eﬀort than males. Allowing for this possibility, we adapt the contest
model used above to allow for non-linear utility, similar to the model of Skaperdas and Gan
(1995).
To focus the analysis on diﬀerences in risk aversion, we assume that the competitors are
otherwise symmetric, with a = aM = aF, v = vM = vF, and c = cM = cF. Competitors have
the same initial resource Y> 0. Let y denote his payout at the end of the competition, where
y = Y +v−cei if he wins, and y = Y −cei if he loses. Player utility over y exhibits constant
absolute risk aversion, with Ui(y)=−exp(−ρiy). We use exp to denote the exponential
function to reduce confusion with the eﬀort variable. The variable ρi denotes one’s level of
risk aversion. Assuming that females are more risk averse than males means 0 <ρ M <ρ F.
We formally derive the result for this situation in the appendix.17 The player who puts
forth the greatest eﬀort experiences the greatest performance since ability is the same for
all players. In a competition between two same-gender players, equilibrium eﬀort (and
performance) is strictly decreasing in risk aversion. Since ρM <ρ F, this implies that p∗
FvF <
p∗
MvM. In a contest between two diﬀerent type opponents with close-enough risk parameters,





FvM. Together, this analysis implies the following result.











This condition satisﬁes C1.
4 Additional Evidence
By comparing the equilibrium predictions from the theoretical analysis with the signiﬁcant
empirical results, C1 and C2, we are able to reject many of the explanations for the male
advantage which have been put forth in the literature. We are unable to reject four possible
explanations: (i) males are higher-ability competitors than females, (ii) females tend to be
underconﬁdent of their own abilities, (ii) males enjoy competition or care about winning more
17The analysis assumes that ρM and ρF are suﬃciently close, an assumption that assures an interior
pure-strategy equilibrium exists (see Skaperdas and Gan 1995).
16than females, and (iv) males are less risk averse. To further assess these explanations for the
male advantage, we consider additional evidence from our own analysis and the literature.
Both the CMP and aggregate data in Section 2 and Table 1 predict that males tend to
perform better when competing against other males, and females tend to perform better when
competing against other females. However, the ordering of MvM and MvF performance, and
of FvF and FvM performance is not signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.510 in the male case, and p-
value = 0.242 in the female case). In addition to considering the eﬀects of opponent gender
separately for males and females, we also test whether opponent gender has a signiﬁcant aﬀect
on performance in general, for males and females together. On average, across all players,
performance is higher when competing against an opponent of the same gender (p-value =
0.107). As long as a model predicts that at least one of the genders performs better when
competing against an opponent of the same gender, the model is consistent with this evidence.
Any model that predicts that both males and females perform better when competing against
opponents of the other gender, or that predicts that performance is independent of opponent
gender is inconsistent with the evidence. This implies a second condition, which we refer to
as “strongly preferred” given that its evidence is nearly signiﬁcant.
C 2 (strongly preferred) Either males, or females, or both perform better when competing
against an opponent of the same gender.
C2 is satisﬁed by the “ability,” “enjoyment,” and “risk-aversion” models. The “female
underconﬁdence” model, which predicts that performance is independent of opponent gender,
does not satisfy this condition. However, a variant of the female underconﬁdence story in
which females are more underconﬁdent when competing against males (e.g., Result 3) is
consistent with C2.
A third condition is a stricter version of C2. It requires that opponent gender has the
same aﬀect on both male and female performance as we observe in the CMP and aggregate
data. The evidence for this relationship, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant. We therefore
use the condition to highlight models that are most consistent with the empirical evidence,
but we do not reject models that do not satisfy this requirement alone.
C 3 (preferred) Males perform better against a male opponent. Females perform better
against a female opponent.
This condition is satisﬁed by the ability and enjoyment models. The risk-aversion model
and both female underconﬁdence models satisfy the condition for females, but not for males.
It should be noted, however, that the empirical evidence shows opponent gender has a less-
signiﬁcant eﬀect on male performance (p-value = 0.510) than on female performance (p-value
17= 0.242). Therefore, the risk-aversion model and the second underconﬁdence model violate
C3 on the less-signiﬁcant dimension.
A fourth condition places the blame for performance diﬀerences on high male perfor-
mance rather than low female performance. The requirement is based on data from Cotton,
McIntyre and Price (2010) who analyze how performance and gender diﬀerences change over
multiple, sequential rounds of competition. They show that the gender gap disappears with
exposure to competition, and present evidence that the decrease in the gender gap is due
to a decrease in relative male performance rather than an increase in female performance.
Similarly, Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) show
that competition causes males to increase their performance. This suggests a third condition
on which to assess the models.
C 4 (preferred) Higher male performance results from male overperformance, not female
underperformance. The cause of male overperformance decreases with exposure to competi-
tion.
A preferred explanation for the gender diﬀerences in competition should be consistent
with this evidence. Some interpretations of the higher-male-ability story are not consis-
tent with this evidence. C4 allows us to rule out ability-diﬀerence stories in which female
underperform, including explanations involving stereotype threat, or in which competition
increases female nerves or distraction. Other interpretations of the ability measure are con-
sistent with C4. For example, male ability may be increased by a gender-speciﬁc boost in
testosterone or adrenaline at the beginning of competition, and this boost may decrease
with exposure to competition. The higher-male-enjoyment explanation is consistent with
C3, as male enjoyment from competition may start oﬀ high then dissipate over multiple
rounds of competition. The risk-aversion model is also consistent with C4 if males become
more risk-averse over time. The female-underconﬁdence explanation, on the other hand,
violates this preferred condition as it relies on female underperformance rather than male
overperformance.
In another study, G¨ unther et al. (in press, 2010) ﬁnd that the male advantage is task
dependent, as they show that it exists during maze competitions, but not during compe-
titions involving word games, pattern matching, or memory tasks. The paper argues that
performance diﬀerences exist in male-oriented tasks, but not in gender-neutral or female-
oriented tasks.18 In fact, G¨ unther et al. (in press, 2010) presents some evidence that there
exists a female advantage in competitions involving the female-oriented tasks. Similarly,
18Cotton, McIntyre and Price (2010) also ﬁnds no evidence of gender diﬀerences in competitions involving
reading tasks.
18Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) present evidence that the the male advantage turns into a
female advantage when competitions are held in a matrilineal societies. The higher-ability-
male, higher-male-enjoyment, and risk-averse explanations for the gender diﬀerences are
potentially consistent with this additional evidence. For example, males may experience
a greater increase in adrenaline in competitions involving male-oriented tasks, and females
may experience more adrenaline in female-oriented settings. Males may get extra enjoyment
from competition only on male-oriented tasks, and females may get extra enjoyment from
competition on female-oriented tasks. Also, males may only be less risk averse in competi-
tions involving male-oriented tasks, and females may be less risk averse when they involve
female-oriented tasks.
Only two explanations are consistent with all of the empirical evidence. These are the
possibilities that male ability increases when faced with competition, and that males enjoy
competition or care about winning more than females. Note that we are able to dismiss
interpretations of the male-ability advantage that blame the performance gap on female
underperformance rather than higher male performance. One consistent interpretation of
the ability story involves males beneﬁting more from increases in adrenaline or testosterone,
which have been shown in the medical literature to improve physical and mental performance
capacity. A third explanation, that males are less risk averse than females, violates the less-
signiﬁcant dimension of C3, but is otherwise consistent with the evidence. Because of this,
we do not feel comfortable dismissing the risk aversion story, and continue to view it as a
feasible explanation. The female-underconﬁdence story, on the other hand, in inconsistent
with C3 and C4.
5 Conclusion
The literature suggests a number of explanations for the male advantage during competi-
tion. We present a game theoretic framework in which to assess these explanations. We then
compare the equilibrium predictions of the model with the empirical evidence about the rel-
ative performance of males and females, and the eﬀects of opponent gender on performance.
Doing so rules out a number of explanations for the male advantage, including explanations
involving male overconﬁdence, misperceptions about male or female ability, and a number
of explanations involving preference diﬀerences. Other explanations are consistent with the
signiﬁcant empirical evidence (i.e., C1), but inconsistent with all or part of the suggestive
evidence (i.e., C2, C3, and C4). These include explanations involving female underconﬁ-
dence, stereotype threat, and increases to female nervousness or distraction when faced with
competition.
19Two explanations are consistent with all of the empirical evidence we consider. These
include:
• Male ability to perform increases in the face of competition, possibly due to increases
in adrenaline or testosterone.
• Males enjoy competition or care about winning more than females.
A third explanation–that males are less risk averse than females–is consistent with almost
all of the empirical evidence. The risk aversion model predicts that males perform better
against females than against other males, which violates a single condition from the data for
which signiﬁcance is low. Future experimental work might be able to further limit the set of
possibilities. It is also possible that all three of these feasible explanations contribute to the
performance diﬀerences.19
Being able to narrow down the set of possible explanations for the male competitive
advantage has implications for the policy debate. Policy makers should recognize that the
performance diﬀerences during competition are likely not the result of females responding
negatively to competition, but rather the result of males responding favorably to competi-
tion. They are also not likely due to misperception of relative ability, either because of self
conﬁdence diﬀerences or gender stereotypes. This suggests that eﬀorts to expose females to
competition in an eﬀort to decrease underconﬁdence or improve misperceptions about ability
diﬀerences may not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the gender gap. Further work may be done
to gain better understanding of how the design of the contest, or the characteristics of the
competitive workplace aﬀect achievement diﬀerences between males and females. Some work
has started to be done in this regard (e.g., G¨ unther, Ekinci, Schwieren and Strobel in press,
2010, Cotton, McIntyre and Price 2010), but more is needed.
6 Appendix
More Cases of Preference Diﬀerences
We begin with the four cases in which opponent gender aﬀects males and females in similar
ways. Consider ﬁrst the possibility that both males and females enjoy competition more
against males than against females. This is equivalent to the case in which players earn
a greater beneﬁt from winning against a male. This means τH = τFvF = τMvF and τL =
19Possibly some of the explanations we rejected are also present but are overshadowed by one of the
preferred explanations and so do not provide a good description of the data.













From these values we can derive the following results.
Result 8 If players value winning or enjoy competing more against male opponents (i.e.,










If players value winning or enjoy competing more against opponents of the other gender (i.e.,










If males get extra enjoyment from competition against other males (i.e., τMvM <τ MvF =





















If males get more enjoyment from competition against males, and and less enjoyment from










If males get more enjoyment from competition against males, and females get less enjoyment










Each of these possibilities violate C1. The interested reader may solve for other situations
as well.
21Diﬀerences in Risk Aversion









First order conditions with respect to ei simplify to
e−i + ce
2
iρi + ceie−iρi + exp[vρi]e−i((ei + e−i)cρi − 1) = 0. (6)
Checking second order conditions assures that we are solving for a maximum. To ﬁnd the
symmetric equilibrium for the case when the two competitors are the same type, we solve












It is straightforward to show that e∗ is strictly decreasing in ρ. Thus, the higher a gender’s
risk aversion, the lower it’s eﬀort and performance in a competition against a same-type
opponent. Thus, e∗
MvM >e ∗FvF.
Starting from an evenly matched contest, consider the eﬀects of marginally increasing
or decreasing one player’s risk aversion parameter. To do this, we solve for ∂e∗
i/∂ρi and
∂e∗
−i/∂ρi, evaluated at ρi = ρ−i. In doing this, let Zi denote the left hand side of player i’s ﬁrst
order conditions, as given by Eq. 6. Take the derivative of both Zi and Z−i with respect to
ρi, remembering that e∗
i and e∗
−i are functions of the two risk aversion parameters. Therefore,
the resulting expressions for ∂Zi/∂ρi and ∂Z−i/∂ρi will include ∂e∗
i/∂ρi and ∂e∗
−i/∂ρi. Since
we are interested in the marginal eﬀects of changing ρi starting from an even contest, we












exp[2vρ] − 2vρexp[vρ] − 1





exp[2vρ] − 2vρexp[vρ] − 1
8cρ2(1 + exp[vρ])2 (exp[vρM] − 1).
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25Table 1: Normalized Performance Diﬀerences by Gender and Opponent Gender
CMP GNR Aggregate
Gender Treatment
FvM -0.275 -0.454 -0.315
[0.115] [0.179] [0.097]
FvF -0.156 -0.118 -0.141
[0.146] [0.178] [0.113]
MvF 0.052 0.353 0.146
[0.120] [0.179] [0.100]
MvM 0.247 0.218 0.239
[0.117] [0.179] [0.098]
T-Tests of Equality (p-values)
FvM vs. FvF 0.588 0.185 0.242
FvM vs. MvF 0.065 0.001 0.001
FvM vs. MvM 0.002 0.008 0.0001
FvF vs. MvF 0.272 0.063 0.057
FvF vs. MvM 0.032 0.185 0.011
MvF vs. MvM 0.246 0.592 0.510
The top panel lists the mean performance of each gender and opponent gender
combination. For example, FvM lists the average performance of females competing
against males. Standard errors are listed in brackets. There are 253 observations in the
CMP data and 120 observations in the GNR data. The aggregate data combines the two
for 373 observations. The bottom panel reports the p-values from t-tests of equality
between each pair of coeﬃcients.
26Table 2: Mann-Whitney U-tests of Normalized Performance Diﬀerences
CMP GNR Aggregate
FvM vs. FvF 0.836 0.103 0.316
FvM vs. MvF 0.090 0.0004 0.0005
FvM vs. MvM 0.015 0.010 0.0004
FvF vs. MvF 0.219 0.026 0.020
FvF vs. MvM 0.072 0.135 0.021
MvF vs. MvM 0.433 0.563 0.764
The table reports p-values from Mann-Whitney U-tests of equality of the distributions
between any two groups. The test, which is based on rank ordering, does not assume a
particular distribution, but can give a rejection due to diﬀerences in higher moments than
the mean. There are 253 observations in the CMP data and 120 observations in the GNR
data. The aggregate data combines the two for 373 observations.
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